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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FREDERICK MAY & CO., INC. 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
W. PRESCOTT DUNN and 
TRACY COLLINS TRUST 
COMPANY, a Banking 
Corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9356 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
FACTS 
The plaintiff in this case is a broker who pro-
cures and arranges sales of business properties. 
It is a corporation whose business is all conducted 
by its President, Mr. Frederick May. In the interest 
of simplifying we will generally in this brief refer 
to Mr. May and use the pronoun "he" when re-
ferring to the plain tiff. 
In April, 1953 Mr. May entered into a con-
tract with defendant-respondent, W. Prescott Dunn, 
wherein Mr. May would attempt to find a pur-
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chaser for, and negotiate the sale of Keith O'Brien 
Company, vvhich was owned by Mr. Dunn, At the 
same time, at the request of Mr. Dunn, Tracy Col-
lins Trust Company, the co-defendant in this case, 
became associated as a co-broker (R. 26), to work 
with Mr. May in negotiating a sale of the capital 
stock of the said corporation. This agreement pro-
vided for a $25,000.00 broker's fee, to be divided 
evenly between the two brokers, in the event of a 
sale procurred and arranged by them, said division 
to be after first deducting plaintiff's expenses 
(Dunn Dep. p. 3). 
In the next few years, Mr. May made contacts 
and conducted negotiations all over the United 
States, which were to no avail and which have 
nothing to do with this case. 
It was in May, 1954 that Mr. May first con-
tacted Sperry and Hutchinson Company, who later 
bought the Keith O'Brien Company in the trans-
action which gives rise to this lawsuit. Mr. May 
knew that the S. & H. Company, best known for 
their Green Stamps, often invests in retail busi-
nesses, either buying them and operating them out-
right or backing other parties who buy in their own 
name. Mr. May knew of one Guberman who had 
previously bought a store with S. & H. backing. 
Therefore, he contacted S. & H., as well as Guber-
man, to let them know he was looking for a buyer 
for Keith O'Brien (May Dep. p. 7). 
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S. & H. did not commit themselves in any way 
at this time, except to say they did not want to back 
Guberman. However, in February or March of 1956, 
an official of S. & H. came to Salt Lake City and 
looked over the Keith O'Brien properties. They 
assumed the roll of backer for one Riordan, whom 
Mr. May had negotiated with unsuccessfully two 
years previously. Now it appeared Riordan was 
interested again; S. & H. was willing to put up 
50 1o or so of the money; and, since Mr. May had 
contacted S. & H. before, he was notified by Dunn 
that he should again con tact S. & H. and arrange 
for meetings, etc. to work out a deal. Thus, exten-
sive and continual negotiations were carried on be-
tween Mr. May and S. & H., both in New York 
City and in Salt Lake City, until approximately 
June, 1956. At this time talks were broken off as 
substantially all the ground had been covered. (May 
Dep. p. 16-24) 
Soon after this, S. & H. apparently resumed 
negotiations with Mr. Dunn, to the exclusion of Mr. 
May, and a contract for the sale of the business 
to S. & H. Company was concluded on July 27, 1956. 
(R. 16) 
Four days subsequent to this, on July 31, 1956, 
Dunn telephoned Mr. May in New York City to tell 
him that he had decided not to sell the business after 
all, but would rather keep most of the stock him-
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self, and turn part of it over to a brother-in-law. 
(May Dep. p. 26, Dunn Dep. p. 28, 29) 
In this conversation, Dunn offered to give Mr. 
May $5,000.00 merely as a token of appreciation 
for services rendered and expenses incurred in his 
behalf over several years. Then he asked Mr. May, 
inasmuch as no sale would be made, to send Dunn 
a letter terminating their agency contract and ac-
knowledging receipt of the $5,000.00, as payment in 
full for all services rendered, etc. Only later did 
Mr. May learn that at the time he wrote that letter 
and agreed to accept the $5,000.00 as a token pay-
ment, a sale had alre'ady been made to S. & H., 
with whom he had been negotiating all along. (May 
Dep. p. 26) 
At the time the sale was made by Dunn to S. 
& H., Mr. May was excluded from the deal. Ap-
parently, however, Mr. May's co-broker, Tracy Col-
lins Trust Company, was not excluded, since follow-
ing the conclusion of the sale, the seller, Mr. Dunn, 
paid Tracy Collins Trust Company a commission 
of $11,000.00. (Dunn Dep. p. 37) 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The plaintiff was never told of the sale of 
Keith O'Brien to S. & H. until it was told to him 
some time later by a third party. At that time he 
filed the original complaint (R. 1). After filing 
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this complaint, information became available to the 
plaintiff which made it necessary to file an amended 
com plaint ( R. 9) . An answer was filed to this 
amended complaint ( R. 15). In this answer were 
admissions as to dates, etc., which once again made 
it necessary for the pl'aintiff to amend his plead-
ings but, before doing so, he instigated discovery 
procedures, to find what more information might 
be available which would be relevant to the filing 
of correct pleadings. In this discovery procedure, 
depositions were taken from the plaintiff, Mr. May, 
and the defendant, Mr. Dunn. These depositions are 
substantially the only evidence in the record at this 
point, and they will from time to time be referred 
to in this brief. They will be referred to by title and 
page, since the pages in the deposition have not 
been assigned page numbers in the record. Follow-
ing the taking of the depositions, a second amended 
complaint was filed (R. 2'5), to which in due time 
answers were filed by the defendant, W. Prescott 
Dunn (R. 34), and the co-defendant, Tracy Collins 
Trust Company (R. 39). A motion for a summary 
judgment was filed by defendant Dunn ( R. 4'9) and, 
in connection therewith, a memorandum in support 
of defendant's motion for summary judgment (R. 
53-72). This motion came on for hearing before 
the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr. of the Third Ju-
dicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
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State of Utah. Pursuant to that hearing, the motion 
for summary judgment was granted and a judg-
ment of dismissal was rendered (R. 73). Following 
the entry of this summary judgment, the co-defen-
dant, Tracy Collins Trust, filed a similar motion 
and memorandum in support thereof, which came 
on for hearing before the Honorable A. H. Ellett of 
the Third Judicial District Court. Pursuant to that 
hearing, the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment was denied, and so the plaintiff's claim against 
defendant, Tracy Collins Trust, is still before the 
District Court, pending trial. The plaintiff appealed 
the summary judgment, which was granted in favor 
of defendant, W. Prescott Dunn. In this appeal the 
appellant urges the court that the summary judg-
ment entered by the court below should be reversed, 
and the case should be remanded for a trial of the 
issues, on the grounds and for the reasons set forth 
in this brief. 
STATEMEN'T OF POINTS 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED BECAUSE: 
I. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MA-
TERIAL FACTS. 
A. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE AGEN-
CY CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PLAIN-
TIFF AND DEFENDANT? 
B. WAS THE AGENCY CONTRACT EVER 
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CHANGED OR REVOKED BY THE DEFEN-
DANT OR ABANDONED BY THE PLAIN-
TIFF? 
C. WAS THE PLAINTIFF THE "PROCURING 
CAUSE" OF THE SALE? 
1. WAS PLAINTIFF'S CONTACT WITH 
THE OFFICERS OF THE BUYER THE 
CAUSE OF THEIR BECOMING INTER-
ESTED IN BUYING? 
2. IN WHAT CAPACITY DID S. & H. NEGO-
IATE FOR THE SALE - BACKER OR 
BUYER? 
3. AFTER THIS SALE TO S. & H., WAS A 
COMMISSION PAID TO THE BROKER, 
TRACY COLLINS TRUST COMPANY? 
II. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT AND COULD 
NOT REVOKE THE AGENCY CONTRACT 
WITHOUT LIABILITY FOR THE AGREED 
COMMISSION. 
B. PLAINTIFF WAS THE "EFFICIENT" OR 
"PROCURING" CAUSE OF THE SALE TO 
S. & H. 
1. IT MATTERS NOT THAT THE BUYER 
ASSUMED THE ROLE OF "BACKER" 
THROUGH MOST OF THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS. 
2. PLAINTIFF DID NOT AT ANY TIME 
"ABANDON" HIS EFFORTS WITH S. 
& H. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
lVIENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED BECAUSE: 
I. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL 
FASTS; and II. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT EN-
TITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure states the requirement for the rendering of a 
summary judgment as follows: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and ad-
missions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. 
We will argue in this brief that there are in 
the case several genuine issues of material facts 
which will be specifically treated. We will endeavor 
to convince the Court that a reasonable jury could, 
from the evidence on file find in favor of the plain-
tiff-appellant in each disputed question. (See Uli-
barri v. Christensen, 2 U. 2d 367, 275 P 2d 170) 
We will argue that if the disputed questions of fact 
were viewed favorably to the plaintiff, then the 
defendant would not be entitled to a judgment as 
a m'atter of law, but rather, the plaintiff would be 
so en ti tied. 
The court is asked to consider all of the facts 
presented and every inference fairly arising there-
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from in the light most favorable to the appellant in 
accordance with the rule stated in Morris v. Farns-
worth Motel, 123 U. 289, 259 P 2d 297. 
I. A. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE AGENCY 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF AND THE 
DEFENDANT? 
In its motion for summary judgment, the de-
fendant argued that the agreement between the de-
fendant-principal and the plaintiff-agent was clear-
ly a "General Listing", as distinguished from "An 
Exclusive Agency" or an "Exclusive Right to Sell". 
It argued then further that a general listing is 
"revoC'able at the will of the owner in good faith, at 
any time before performance" (R. 54). Having 
said this, he states then, "It, therefore, follows that 
the defendant Dunn was free to make a sale to a 
purchaser without liability for commission, unless 
the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale" 
(R. 55). 
The agency contract in this case is apparently 
purely oral, and therefore, difficult of proof ( R. 55) . 
Agreements generally between principals and brok-
ers have a tendancy to be vague in form, and are 
often subjects of dispute. When there is such a dis-
pute, and it is material to the determination of the 
case, the dispute must be resolved by a trial of the 
facts. These things are questions for a jury. As 
said in 1 Corbin on Contracts, p. 150, 
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Gaps must be filled by that uncertain pro-
cess called implication, a mixture of deter-
mining the meanings of the parties by inter-
pretation of their words and actions, and of 
doing justice according to the mores and prac-
tices of the community. 
It is by no me'ans clear, as defendant claims 
(R. 55) that this agency contract "is no exclusive 
agency or exclusive right to sell". In Mr. May's 
deposition as quoted at R. 55, he was asked: 
Q. Did you consider that this agreement 
that you had with Mr. Dunn gave you an 
exclusive license or an exclusive right to make 
the sale or not make the sale? 
A. I would say, on a moral basis, yes, 
but I wouldn't say that he just outright agreed 
we were his exclusive agents. But the infer-
ences were very clear on his part and Mr. 
Collins' part. 
In other words, Mr. M'ay could not remember 
any specific reference to or guarantees of "exclusive 
agency", etc., but he definitely testified that the in-
ferential flavor of the whole transaction was that 
Mr. May and his co-brokers were to be exclusive 
agents. 
This oral agreenment was had in May, 19S3. 
It is somewhat vague. However, there is available 
to a trier of fact the evidence of the actions and 
words of the parties for a subsequent three-year 
period, which must be considered, along with the 
mores and practices of the community, in order to 
10 
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arrive at a determination of the nature of the con-
tract. 
Thus, it is urged that reasonable men could 
differ as to the nature of the agency contract in 
this case, and ~a trial of the facts must be had to 
determine the question. 
I. B. WAS THE AGENCY CONTRACT EVER 
CHANGED OR REVOKED BY THE DEFENDANT, OR 
ABANDONED BY THE PLAINTIFF? 
There seems to be no question of the fact that 
in 1953 the plaintiff and the defendant entered into 
an agency agreement, whereby plaintiff was pro-
mised a certain commission if and when he should 
find a buyer and negotiate a sale of the capital 
stock of Keith O'Brien. There is a question, how-
ever, as to the nature of that agreement (discussed 
supra, Point I A). There is, then, also a question 
as to whether plaintiff was the "procuring cause" 
of the sale to S. & H. (infra, I C). If either or 
both of these major questions should be answered in 
favor of the plaintiff, then there would still be the 
question considered now. That is, given that there 
was an agency contract and that pursuant thereto 
the plaintiff came into contact with the buyer, etc., 
then the defendant seems to suggest that the plain-
tiff is neverthless not entitled to a commission be-
cause at some timely point the agency contract was 
terminated by the defendant, or else abandoned by 
the plaintiff. 
11 
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The law concerning this point is discussed at 
II A, infra. It is, in essence, that regardless of which 
category of agency agreements this one falls into, it 
cannot be revoked after the agent has substantially 
performed his part of the agreement. Furthermore, 
it can only be revoked by notice to the agent of the 
principal's intention to revoke (see citations, etc. 
in II A). 
It is somewhat difficult to discuss this ques-
tion because it doesn't appear clear just what de-
fendant's position on it is. Perhaps defendant means 
to imply that the agreement was revoked in March, 
1956 at the time defendant asked Mr. May to con-
tact S. & H. and represent him in negotiations with 
them. In other words, perhaps a jury would be asked 
to believe that Mr. Dunn's intended meaning was 
something like this: "Now, Mr. May, you have not 
found a buyer and our agreement is revoked. Now, 
I have found one and I would like you to contact 
them for me and negotiate with them, for which I'll 
perhaps pay you a fee at some future time." 
There is no evidence in the record at this point 
to indicate that anything like this was understood 
by the parties. If something like this is intended 
by the defendant's position then it would have to 
be developed in a trial of the facts. As argued in 
I C, infra, a more reasonable interpretation would 
be that the defendant's "direction" of Mr. May to 
12 
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contact S. & H. was a recognition that Mr. May had 
talked to them before and that they were now show-
ing increased interest and he should follow up with 
them. 
Perhaps defendant means to argue that the 
agency contract was revoked in June, 1956. At that 
time negotiations between S. & H. and Riordan 
on one side and Mr. May, Tracy Collins and the 
defendant on the other side were concluded. Per-
haps the defendant is claiming that he then de-
cided to revoke the agency con tract and go ahead 
and sell the business on his own. It would be reason-
able, however, for a jury to hold that at this point 
Mr. May had already done about all there was to 
do in bringing either or both of the prospective 
buyers to a sale and that he, therefore, had "per-
formed" his part of the agreement and defendant 
could not then legally revoke without liability for 
a commission. Besides, no notice of any intended 
revocation was given at this time so that any pur-
ported revocation would be invalid. (See 1 Corbin 
on Contracts 153) 
Finally, the defendant did give notice of revo-
cation on July 31, 1956. On that date Mr. May agreed 
to a termination of the agency contract and to ac-
cept a token fee payment. However, this agreement 
on Mr. May's part was procurred through the fraud-
ulent misrepresentation by defendant that the busi-
13 
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ness would not be sold, whereas, in fact, it had al-
ready been sold four days before to one of the two 
prospective buyers that Mr. May had been working 
with all along. (See May Dep. p. 26 and Dunn Dep. 
p. 28) 
Thus, it is the plaintiff's position that the 
agency contract was never terminated and that, 
since the plaintiff was the "procuring cause" of the 
sale (as argued infra) he is entitled to the payment 
of the agreed commission. 
There is, then, the further question of whether 
the plaintiff ever abandoned his employment. The 
defendant contends at R. 69 that he did following 
the conclusion of negotiations in June, 1'956. In sup-
port of this contention, defendant quotes from Mr. 
May's deposition on page 26 thereof, where he said: 
"That ended it as far as I was concerned with S. 
& H." 
The plaintiff has two answers to this conten-
tion: First. even in view of the apparent finality of 
the quoted statement of Mr. May, when taken out 
of con text, the totality of his testimony does not 
supply enough for any court to hold as a matter 
of law that Mr. May had "abandoned" his employ-
ment as an agent. 
Secondly, if a jury should be convinced that Mr. 
May had actually come to a decision that he must 
abandon all further efforts with S. & H., then it 
14 
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is plain tiff's contention that the evidence would show 
that he was brought to that decision through fraud-
ulent misrepresentation on the part of the defen-
dant, or S. & H., or both. The pleadings and deposi-
tions show that it was only a relatively few days 
between the concluding of negotiations and the sign-
ing of a deal by S. & H. 
In other words, Mr. May was led to consider 
S. & H. only as a backer and then to believe that a 
deal would not be made because of insurmountable 
difficulties. For these reasons he went home. Then, 
almost immediately, without his knowledge, S. & H. 
was suddenly signing on the dotted line. 
The plaintiff contends there must be a jury 
trial to consider the evidence of the defendant's lack 
of good faith in bringing about a situation which 
he now relies on as "abandonment" by the plaintiff. 
(See discussion of law on this point in II B, infra) 
I. C. (1) WAS PLAINTIFF'S CONTACT WITH THE 
OFFICERS OF THE BUYER THE CAUSE OF THEIR 
BECOMING INTERESTED IN BUYING? 
In the memorandum supporting defendant's 
motion for summary judgment the defendant 
stresses the claimed fact that Mr. May was not the 
first one to contact S. & H., and that his first con-
tact with S. & H. was later, at the direction of Mr. 
Dunn. This does not appear from the record as 
claimed. On the contrary, Mr. May's deposition, in-
15 
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eluding the parts quoted in defendant's memoran-
dum, indicate that Mr. May's first contact with 
S. & H. was prior to any instructions from the de-
fendant. The answers to interrogatories quoted by 
defendant at R. 57 also bear this out. Interrogatory 
No. 1 asked what date Mr. May first contacted 
S. & H. The answer was that Mr. May contacted 
Morris Guberman in May, 1954, and then: 
At that time Mr. Guberman sought fi-
nancial assistance from S. & H. to enable him 
to purchase this stock. Within a very short 
time thereafter Mr. Frederick May spoke to 
the then President of Sperry and Hutchinson 
Company, regarding the availability of finan-
cing for Mr. Guberman in his proposed pur-
chase of the capital stock of Keith O'Brien. 
(R. 57) 
The testimony of Mr. May, in his deposition 
(May Dep. p. 7, 8) also makes it clear that Mr. 
May first spoke to an officer of S. & H. in 1954. 
S. & H. had no contact with Mr. Dunn personally 
relative to this sale until March, 1956 (May Dep. 
p. 16). 
The conclusion seems inescapable, then, that 
the Sperry and Hutchinson Company, who ultimate-
ly became the buyers, were first interested in the 
property and first learned that the business was 
for sale through the efforts of the plaintiff. 
There is some conflict in the evidence before 
the court at this point, as to whether Mr. May 
16 
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called the President of S. & H., or vice versa. How-
ever, this writer cannot see that it makes any dif-
ference. It makes no n1ore difference than if S. & H. 
had become ·aware that Keith O'Brien was for sale by 
reading an advertisement instigated by the plain-
tiff, and then calling the plaintiff. In other words, 
that is the nature of the efforts and methods of 
agents in such transactions. They undertake to 
spread the word among appropriate parties that a 
property is for S'ale. Very often the party who ulti-
mately becomes the buyer is not approached cold 
by the agent, but rather hears of the deal through 
the agent's other feelers or contacts, and then con-
tacts the agent. Perhaps that is what happened here. 
The point i·s that the court could not be sure 
at this point. There is not enough evidence in the 
record for any court to decide as a matter of Jaw 
that the plaintiff did not "find" the buyer. Indeed, 
what evidence is in the record suggests strongly that 
he did. However, there is other evidence which should 
be considered. A jury should hear the testimony 
of the officers of S .. & H. themselves, as to when and 
how they first became aware of ·and interested in 
the possible purchase of Keith O'Brien, and their 
undestanding as to the role played by Mr. May 
throughout the transaction. 
The defendant also places great emphasis on 
the fact that defendant "directed" Mr. May to con-
17 
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tact S. & H. in 1956. This is apparently supposed 
tq be conclusive evidence that Mr. May's previous 
contact with S. &. H. (R. 57) was completely in ... 
operative in introducing S. & H. to the idea of 
purchasing Keith O'Brien. To complete the picture 
(which defendant does not do) we are apparently 
asked to interpret that Mr. Dunn had "found" the 
buyer and he asked Mr. May to represent him in 
talks with S. & H., merely as some kind of an errand 
boy. His employment for this purpose was apparent-
ly to be completely separate from the original agency 
contract, although no agreement was made concern-
ing pay for these services, etc. 
We suggest to the court that a more reasonable 
interpretation is that Mr. Dunn had in mind the 
original agency agreement, and he knew Mr. May 
had talked with S. & H. before, and so he ·asked Mr. 
May to continue to represent him according to that 
agreement, by contacting S. & H. again and nego-
tiating with them and anyone else they might wish 
to associate with for ·a purchase. In other words, 
when S. & H. expressed to Dunn in 1956 an interest 
in a deal, and asked for financial statements, etc. 
Dunn asked Mr. May to go and see them. A jury 
could reasonably interpret this as 'an admission on 
the part of Dunn that he still had a valid agency 
contract with Mr. May, and that May had talked 
with S. & H. before; therefore, May was given in-
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structions to go ahead and negotiate a sale, as per 
the agency contract. 
The important point to all of this is that it is 
a question for a jury. This point is part of the larger 
question of procuring cause. As stated in 8 Am. Jur. 
1088: 
When a broker is the procuring cause of 
a sale it is a question of considerable diffi-
culty; in the main it is a question of fact for 
a jury, the decision in each case being de-
penedent upon the particular facts and cir-
cumstances thereof. (See Rose v. Hunter, 317 
P. 2d 1027 (Cal.) and Carpenter v. Francis, 
319 P. 2d 497 (Colo.) and Shelton v. Tafley, 
329 P. 2d 672 (Okla.) ) 
I. C. (2) IN WHAT CAPACITY DID S. & H. NEGO-
TIATE FOR THE SALE - BACKER OR BUYER? 
A great deal of defendant's case seems to rest 
on the alleged fact that throughout all the negoti'a-
tions in which Mr. May participated, S. & H. was 
only a prospective backer, or financier of someone 
else, (R. 62). This is supposed to mean, then, that 
since Mr. May only considered them a backer and 
not a prospective purchaser in their own right, his 
negotiations with them could have nothing to do 
with their becoming sole purchaser a few days after 
his last meeting with them. The law concerning this 
question will be considered below in point II B. Our 
purpose here is to contend that irrespective of the 
law on the point, there is a rna terial question or 
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perha,ps ,, sever~l questions of fact which should be 
considered by a jury. 
The evidence in the record is claimed by the de-
fendant to prove that S. & H. played the role of 
backer for someone else right up to June, 1956. 
However, the question is: Did they play that role 
in good faith? Also, was the defendant acting in 
good faith in purporting to believe them? 
The plaintiff contends that evidence offered 
at a trial of the facts will show that S. & H. enter-
tained the possibility of buying the property out-
right, if a favorable deal could be worked out, right 
from the first contact with Mr. May, or if not right 
at first then surely very early in his negotiations 
with them. 
Plaintiff does not know at this point what the 
evidence will show as to the good faith of the defen-
dant, Dunn, or of the co-broker, Tracy Collins Trust, 
but the jury should consider the question as to 
whether they or either of them honestly and reason-
ably believed that S. & H. had no interest in buying 
outright. 
If the jury believed in defendant's good faith 
up to the breaking off of negotiations, then it would 
still be reasonable to hold he did not act in good 
faith when he failed to call Mr ~·· May back when 
S. & H. suddenly reappeared as the buyer a few 
days later. 
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It is relevant, in assessing defendant's good 
faith, to consider that when defendant did next con-
tact Mr. May, it was after the sale was made and 
for the purpose of inducing him through fraudulent 
misrepresentation to terminate the agency contract 
and accept a token payment. (May Dep. p. 26) 
I. C. (3) AFTER THE SALE TO S. & H., WAS A 
COMMISSION PAID TO THE CO-BROKER, TRACY 
COLLINS TRUST COMPANY? 
We must briefly call attention to the question 
as to the nature of the payment of $11,000.00 to 
Tracy Collins Trust Co. The defendant claims that 
this payment was a voluntary payment for this and 
other services Tracy-Collins had rendered in the 
past (Dunn Dep. p. 37). Plaintiff contends that a 
jury would reasonably hold that this payment was 
a payment of commission for the sale of Keith 
O'Brien, substantially in line with the amount agreed 
in the original agency agreement between Dunn and 
the co-agents, May and Tracy-Collins. Thus, Tracy-
Collins was paid as agreed and Mr. May was not. 
In other words, it is plaintiff's contention that 
this payment of a commission to Tracy Collins con-
stitutes an admission on the part of the defendant 
that a broker's commission was owing on the sale 
of Keith O'Brien. Yet, there is nothing to show 
why the agreed commission (or very close to it) was 
paid to Tracy Collins, while a much smaller token 
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amount was paid to its co-broker, May. It is claimed 
that Mr. May is not en ti tied to the agreed commis-
si"on because he was not the "procuring cause" of 
the sale. This, based on the argument that he did 
not contact S. & H. first, etc. However, there is no 
claim anywhere that Tracy Collins was the "pro-
curing cause". There's no claim that Tracy Collins 
foundS. & H. They were not even actively working 
on the soliciting of buyers (May Dep. p. 5) . 
The point is that this is another very important 
item of the case, about which there is a dispute which 
ought to be resolved by a jury. 
II. A. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT AND COULD 
NOT REVOKE THE AGENCY CONTRACT WITHOUT 
LIABILITY FOR THE AGREED COMMISSION. 
We argued in point I A that one of the m·aterial 
issues of fact is whether the agency contract in this 
case is a "general listing", an "exclusive agency" 
or an "exclusive right to sell". Now, however, it 
is argued that even if a jury were to hold that this 
agency contract was in the nature of a "general 
listing", and thus revocable, then according to the 
law, even as argued by defendant at R. 54, the de-
fendant is still liable for the agreed commission. 
This, on the grounds that the defendant's revoca-
tion was not "in good faith" and did not take place 
"at any time before performance". (Tetrick v. Sloan, 
339 P. 2d 613 ( 1959) at page 617). Also, it was not 
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effected by a notice of revocation to the plaintiff. 
We read at 1 Corbin on Contracts 15'3 a dis-
cussion of this type of agency contract and the fol-
lowing: 
Here the only contemplated contract be-
tween the owner and the broker is a unila tral 
con tract - a promise to pay a commission 
for services rendered. Such an offer as this 
is revocable by the owner by notice before 
the broker has rendered any part of the re-
quested service; possibly also before he has 
rendered a substantial part of the service. 
A sale by the owner to a third party, with no 
notice thereof to the broker, is certainly not 
operative as a revocation. (emphasis ours) 
In a good many cases of this kind it has 
been held that the owner is no longer privi-
leged to revoke his offered promise after the 
broker has taken substantial steps in the pro-
cess of rendering the requested service, by 
advertising the property for sale, sol'ici ting 
prospective buyers, showing the property or 
otherwise ; in such a case, the revocation and 
discharge of the broker is held to be a breach 
of con tract. (See cases cited in notes of this 
section.) 
Mr. May contacted the ultimate buyer in this 
case and negotiated with it over many months, right 
down to a date within only a few days of the date 
the transaction was completed (May Dep. p. 16-24). 
It is apparently during those few days between the 
time Mr. May finished up the negotiations with 
the buyer and the time of the ·actual closing of the 
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deal that the defendant now purports to have re-
voked the agency con tract and made the sale on his 
own, although no notice of such revocation was given 
Mr. May at that time. Thus, Mr. May, the agent, 
had already performed, according to the agency 
agreement. He had found a buyer and conducted 
negotiations with that buyer right up to just before 
the signing on the dotted line. Furthermore, de-
fendant's purported revocation was not in good faith, 
since it was done for the sole purpose of taking ad-
vantage of plaintiff's services, while depriving him 
of his agreed commission. (See Patterson v. Blair, 
25'7 P. 2d 944 (Utah)). It is significant in this re-
gard that plaintiff wa:s not notified of the revoca-
tion until after the sale had been made, and then he 
was falsely told no sale was going to be made. Thus, 
according to the law, as stated in Corbin on Con-
tracts and quoted above, the defendant in this case 
did not effectively revoke the agency agreement 
until after the sale was completed, since notice to 
the agent is necessary to revoke such an agreement. 
It is for a jury to determine after considera-
tion of the evidence whether defendant acted in 
good faith in going ahead with the sale without 
plaintiff's knowledge as this question bears on de-
fendant's right to revoke the agency contract with-
out liability for a commission. (See cases: Sill v. 
Ceschi, 167 Cal. 698, 140 P. ·949 and White v. Reskin, 
90 Cal. App. 512, 265 P. 1016. 
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II. B. PLAINTIFF WAS THE "EFFICIENT" OR 
"PROCURING" CAUSE OF THE SALE TO THE BUYER. 
(1) IT MATTERS NOT THAT THE BUYER ASSUMED 
THE ROLE OF "BACKER" THROUGH MOST OF THE 
NEGOTIATIONS. 
The law concerning the right of a broker to a 
commission upon the sale of property is really very 
simple. All of the cases and other authorities gen-
erally set up a formula which contains two rules or 
requirements. Then all the cases involve applying 
the facts to this standard. There are many cases 
in the books because the variety of factual situations 
in this type of a case is infinite. Most of the cita-
tions of the defendant, in connection with its mo-
tion for summary judgment, expressed the general 
rule mentioned above, and which the plaintiff readily 
accepts. 
As a good example, let us quote from the case 
of Hayutin v. DeAndrea, 237 P. 2d 383, from which 
the defendant quotes at length at R. 64: 
First. Before the broker can be said to 
have earned his commission, he must produce 
a purchaser who is ready, willing and able 
to purchase the property, upon the terms and 
at a price designated by the principal. 
Second. The broker must be the effi-
cient or procuring cause of the sale. The means 
employed by him and his efforts must result 
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in the sale. He must find the purchaser, and 
the sale must proceed from his efforts acting 
as broker. (Babcock v. Merritt, 1 Colo. app. 
84, 27 p. 882.) (See also Van Leewen v. Huf-
faker, 74 U. 441,280 P. 235.) 
Thus we see that the two rules or requirements 
which must be met for a broker to receive a com-
mission are: 1. He must produce a purchaser who 
is ready, willing and able to purchase, and 2. The 
sale must proceed from his efforts acting as broker. 
By way of qualification or explanation of the second 
of these two rules, the court in that same case quoted 
from 12 C.J.S. page 209 (See R. 64), as follows: 
While it is not essential that the broker's 
efforts be the sole cause of the sale or other 
transaction, it is essential that they be the 
predominating effective cause, and they are 
not sufficient to entitle him to a commission 
where they are merely an indirect, incidental 
or contributing cause, or one of the links in 
a chain of causes. 
There is nothing in the law, as quoted above, 
nor in any of the cases pre sen ted which say by any 
stretch of interpretation that the broker does not 
get a commission if the buyer he produces, and who 
buys through his efforts, posed as a backer rather 
than a buyer during some of the negotiations. 
There is one great and overwhelming fact in 
this case which, all by itself, could reasonably be held 
to make completely irrelevant any of the evidence 
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that S. & H. posed as a backer during its negotia-
tions with the plaintiff. This one imrortant fact is 
the fact that S. & H. did buy the property in ques-
tion. This is particularly so when it is shown that 
they bought only a few days following the end of 
a long period of negotiations conducted by the plain-
tiff in his capacity as broker for the defendant. 
This, then, is absolutely conclusive proof that the 
first rule suggested above was complied with. In 
other words, it is completely obvious that S. & H. 
was ready, willing and able to buy the property 
because, in fact, they did buy the property. (See 
Hudgens v. Caraway, 55 N.M. 458, 235 P. 2d 140) 
In many cases involving this type of question 
the plaintiff has a different problem of proof and 
argument. The plaintiff is often attempting to prove 
that he found a buyer who was ready, willing and 
able to buy, and then that he negotiated with that 
buyer and brought him to the point of sale, and that 
he, therefore, is en ti tied to a commission, even though 
the defendant seller sold the property to someone 
else. If the case at bar were that type of a case, 
then the fact of S. & H.'s posing as backer instead 
of buyer would be very material, in fact it would 
be almost impossible for an agent to prove that he 
had a buyer who was ready, willing and able to 
buy in the face of evidence that the party he had 
procured was never considered as a buyer, but only 
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as ~ backer. However, in this case, all of that diffi-
culty has been obviated by the fact that the party 
which the plaintiff claims to have 'brought forward 
actually was the buyer. 
The rest of the question is purely a question 
of fact. In other words, we know we had a party 
who was ready, willing and able to purchase, be-
cause they did purchase. The only thing remaining 
is requirement No.2, the question as to whether this 
purchaser was found by this plaintiff, and whether 
the sale proceeded from this plaintiff's efforts. This 
is purely a question of .fact, which has already been 
discussed in this brief at point I C supra. (See 
Steele v. Seth, 172 A 2d 338 at 39'2 (Md.), Thornton 
v. Forbes, 326 Mass. 308, 93 N.E. 2d 7 42 at 7 44, 
Buckholz v. Gorsuch, 144 Md. 62, 124 A 389, Heslop 
v. Dieudonne, 120 A 669 (Md.) at 672). 
None of the cases cited by the defendant, in con-
nection with his motion for summary judgment, 
states any rule of law contrary to this. Each of these 
cases is greatly distinguishable from the instant 
case on its facts. In the first case cited at R. 63, 
Hayutin v. DeAndrea, 237 P. 2d 383, the plaintiff 
agent was claiming a commission because he par-
ticipated in the negotiations leading up to a sale, 
but he lost because it was admitted in that case 
that the plaintiff had absolutely nothing to do with 
the finding or introducing of the buyer. In the case 
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at bar the plaintiff claims to be in a position to 
prove that he did "find" and introduce the buyer. 
(See point I C supra) . In the second case cited by 
the defendant, that of Wood v. Hutchinson Coal Co., 
176 F. 2d 682, the plaintiff claimed a commission 
because he brought the buyer in contact with the 
seller, but he lost because the evidence showed in 
that case that, at the time the said introduction 
was made, there was nothing for sale, and the in-
troduction had nothing to do with the property which 
was only much later put up for sale by the seller. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff ,claims to have been 
the first to contact the ultimate buyer, specifically 
with regard to the sale of the subject property, at 
a time when that property definitely was up for 
sale. 
In the case of Clarke v. Ellsworth, 184 P. 2d 
821, cited at R. 65, the agent lost because the buyer 
became aware that the property was for sale com-
pletely independently of the agent; in fact, before 
the property had even been listed with the agent 
and the buyer then contacted the seller and nego-
tiated a sale, completely independent of the agent. 
In our case, however, the plaintiff claims that 'a 
reasonable jury would find that the buyer was in-
troduced to the sale by the plain tiff, and that the 
plaintiff was the efficient cause of his being brought 
to the point of sale. 
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In the case of Nelson v. Mayer, 265 P. 2d 52, 
quoted at R. 67, suffice it to say that the transac-
tions in that case went through a long and com-
plicated chain of events and people which have no 
resemblance whatsoever to the facts of the case 
at bar. 
In conclusion, the plaintiff contends that none 
of the cases relied upon by the defendant in his 
motion for summary judgment could be held to 
supply the District Court with authority to hold, 
as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was not the 
"procuring cause" of the sale upon which he claims 
a right to the agreed commission. 
II. B. (2) ABANDONMENT. 
There is the further question of abandonment 
on the part of the agent. Again with respect to this 
question, we must simply admit and agree to the 
existence of the rule stated by the defendant. We 
must then, however, respectfully point out that the 
question as to whether the particular agent has 
abandoned his employment is a question for the jury, 
unless the pleadings and evidence in the record ad-
mit of only one conclusion, which is not true here. 
We will, then, attempt to show how the cases relied 
upon by the defendant, in seeking a summary judg-
ment in the court below, are distingishable on their 
facts from the case at bar. 
The rule with respect to abandonment on the 
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part of a broker is quite well summarized in 8 Am. 
Jur. 1069, Brokers Section 144. This section was 
quoted in the case of Withers v. Sohrweid, 257 P. 2d 
267. This case and the said section of American 
J Hrisprudence quoted therein were quoted by the de-
fendant at R. 69. For convenience, we will present 
it again here : 
If a broker, after introducing a prospec-
tive customer to his employer to no purpose, 
abandons his employment entirely, or if, after 
procuring a person who proves to be unwilling 
to accept the terms of his principal, he merely 
ceases to make further endeavors to negoti-
ate a deal with that particular individual and 
all negotiations in that direction are com-
pletely broken off and terminated, he will not 
be entitled to a commission if his employer 
subsequently renews negotiations with the 
same person either directly or through the me-
dium of another agent, and thus effects a 
sale without further effort on the part of the 
broker first employed. 
A few lines below this quotation at 8 Am. Jur. 
1069, the following is stressed: 
The question as to when the broker will 
be deemed to have abandoned his efforts to 
sell depends upon the facts of the individual 
case. The mere fact that some time elapses 
after the broker has discontinued his efforts 
to make a sale before the sale is made in fact 
by the owner is not evidence of itself that 
there has been complete abandonment of the 
negotiations. 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
By way of a further brief clarification· of the 
rule, let us present one more brief quotation from 
the case of Real Estate Enterprises v. Collins, 256 
S. W. 2d 286 (Mo.), also cited and quoted from 
by the defendant at R. 70, 71: 
. . . Where there is a definite break in 
the continuity of the negotiations amounting 
to an abandonment of the deal and new forces 
thereafter enter which bring about a renewal 
of the negotiations and themselves become the 
effective cause of the sale, the initial efforts 
may not then be regarded as the proximate 
procuring cause ... (emphasis ours) 
... All this came about without any pre-
tence of fraud or lack of good faith on the 
part of defendants. What happened was that 
long, long after plaintiff's agency had expired, 
defendants renewed the negotiations and suc-
ceeded in bringing about a sale, which was 
referrable, not to the negotiations which had 
been oarried on while plaintiff's contract was 
in force, but to the efforts of defendants which 
were initiated after plaintiff's contract was 
term ina ted. (emphasis ours) 
Thus, the rule becomes clear; if an agent aband-
ons his efforts with a prospective buyer, and the 
seller renews negotiations with that buyer and makes 
a sale, the agent can be deprived of his commissions, 
but only if some new forces have entered the pic-
ture, which new forces become the effective cause 
of the sale, or if the new negoti~ations and the sale 
are consummated after the termination of the 
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agent's agency contract. Furthermore, all this must 
happen without any claim or evidence of fraud or 
lack of good faith on the part of the defendant prin-
cipal. 
Thus, we point out the distinctions between the 
cases cited by the defendant and the case at bar. 
The evidence in this case does show that, following 
the conclusion of negotiations some time in June 
of 1956, the plaintiff did not have occasion to con-
tact the buyer any more. However, there is no show-
ing of any new forces entering the picture, which 
could be shown to have supplanted the efforts of the 
plaintiff as the efficient cause of the sale. Further-
more, we have already argued at point I Band II A, 
that the agency contract was never terminated until 
after the sale had been completed. In addition to 
this, the claim is made by the plain tiff, and there is 
a strong inference from the evidence in the record, 
that there was a lack of good faith in all of this 
on the part of the defendant, Among other things, 
such an inference of lack of good faith could be 
made from the misrepresentations made by the de-
fendant to the plaintiff at the time the plaintiff was 
induced to terminate the agency contract, after the 
sale to S. & H. had been made (See Dunn Dep. page 
28 & 29 and May Dep. p. 26). 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the appellant urges the court to 
find that there are in the case genuine issues of 
material fact, as outlined herein, and therefore, 
that the defendant-respondent was not entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law, but rather a trial 
of the issues should be had to determine the facts 
in the case, for this reason, the judgment of the 
District Court should be reversed, and the the case 
should be remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WHITE, ARNOVITZ, & SMITH 
Attorneys for Appellant 
913 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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